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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990899-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

THOMAS T. CHERRY,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that Cherry

willfully offered or sold a security? This Court will reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." State
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997).
This issue was preserved in a motion for a directed verdict made during trial (R.
580 at 49-51).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Thomas T. Cherry appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of sale of an unregistered security
and being an unregistered securities agent, third degree felonies.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Thomas T. Cherry was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on

or about December 13, 1996, with twelve counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah
Code Annotated §§ 61-1-1, 21; one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-1,3,7; one count of sale
of an unregistered security in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-7, 21; and one
count of sales by an unregistered securities agent in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§§ 61-1-3(1), 7 (R. 15-16). On May 28, 1998, a fourth amended information was filed
which charged Cherry with the same offenses (R. 157-67).
On October 21-23, 1997, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable
Ray M. Harding, Sr. (R. 99-102). At the close of the hearing the trial court took the
matter under advisement (R. 99).
On May 12, 1999, the State filed a notice of expert witnesses relating to
S.Anthony Taggart from the Utah Division of Securities, John Hjartarson from the
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Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation; and John Hansen from the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management (Wyoming) (R. 269-81).
On May 20, 1999, a hearing relating to a waiver of a conflict of interest was
held (R. 282-83).
On June 1, 1999, the State filed a trial memorandum (R. 332-55).
On June 7-22, 1999, a jury trial was held on the charges with Judge Eyre
presiding (R. 439-50). Jury Instructions (R. 372-430).
After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of not guilty on all eleven
counts of securities fraud1 and not guilty on the racketeering charge and a verdict of
guilty on sales by an unlicensed securities agent and sale of an unregistered security (R.
435-37). Co-defendant, Ron Zenger, was acquitted of all charges.
On August 13, 2001, Cherry was placed on 36 months probation and was
ordered to serve 60 days in the Utah County Jail, pay a fine and surcharge in the
amount of $3700.00 (R. 485-487, 491-93). Cherry was also granted a 30 day
extension in which to file a notice of appeal up to and including October 13, 1999 (R.
485, 496).
On October 7, 1999, Cherry filed a memorandum regarding the issue of
restitution as requested by the trial court (R. 497-504). In his memorandum, Cherry
argued that restitution could not be ordered by the trial court for the following reasons:
One, that he was acquitted of the securities fraud charges. Two, that the regulatory
offenses he was convicted of did not cause an injury to any named individuals. Three,
there are no pecuniary damages that attach to the regulatory offenses of which he was

*One count of securities fraud had been dismissed by the State prior to trial.
3

convicted. Four, that the imposition of restitution in this case would be violative of
Cherry's right to due process. State's response (R. 514-520). Reply memo (R. 52425).
On January 24, 2000, Cherry was ordered to pay $2,986, 514.00 jointly and
severally with co-defendant Rodney Blackford, who was convicted of securities fraud
(R. 532-36). On March 29, 2000, a restitution hearing wss held and the amount of
restitution was subsequently modified to $50,000 (R. 546-47, 549-51).
On October 13, 1999, Cherry filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court
(R. 512).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Stephen Anthony Taggert
Stephen Taggert testified that since July of 1998 he has been the director of the

Utah Division of Securities and is responsible for administering the Securities Act (R.
577 at 94). Prior to July of 1998, Taggert was the Director of Corporate Finance for the
Division of Securities (R. 577 at 95). As Director of Corporate Finance, Taggert
supervised the examiners that reviewed prospectuses and other offering that came into
the Division of Securities (R. 577 at 95). Taggert works for the State of Utah including
the Attorney General's office (R. 577 at 135).
Taggert testified that "[m]ost securities statutes will include a list of different
financial products that would be considered a security. It will include such things as
stock, bonds, investment contracts" (R. 577 at 98). Taggert testified that an investment
contract is when there is "an investment of money in a common enterprise with the
4

expectation of profit to be derived from the essential managerial efforts of a third party or
promoter" (R. 577 at 98). Taggert also testified that under Utah law "participation in an
oil and gas lease would also be considered a security" (R. 577 at 98).
Taggert testified that the general rule is that before a security can be sold, it must
be registered unless an exemption is found (R. 577 at 100). In addition, "whoever is
offering securities must be licensed to sell a security in the State of Utah" unless
excepted by law (R. 577 at 101). To obtain a license to sell securities, an application has
to be filed with the Division of Securities and a test must be taken and passed (R. 577 at
102).
Taggert testified that Blackford Energy Company, Petro Tech, Sharco, Gem Tech,
Three Rivers, Bastian Oil & Gas, Power Financial Group, and Equity Partnership were
not registered nor exempted from registration with the Division of Securities in the State
of Utah (R. 577 at 103). Taggert also testified that neither Thomas T. Cherry nor Ronald
Zenger has been licensed as a broker/dealer/agent in the State of Utah (R. 577 at 104).
Cherry had filed an application and had passed the test but the application was
withdrawn (R. 577 at 104, 124).
Taggert defined a general partnership as when "two or more people that come
together to do business for a profit" and that the partners will "have equal control, equal
vote, depending on their capital contribution, and they will also have a passthrough of
profits and losses" (R. 577 at 113). Taggert testified that a general partnership is
typically not a security because all partners have the "actual ability to protect their
investment" and all have access to information; on the other hand, a limited partnership
is considered a security (R. 577 at 113-14, 133, 138).
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Taggert opined that Blackford Energy Company constituted a security (R. 577 at
115). Taggert based his opinion on the fact that the partners "really exercised very little
control" and that "most of the control was in the hands of the managing general partner"
(R. 577 at 117). Taggert added that under the voting structure of the partnership it was
"so impractical that a small investor that put in, say, a thousand or $2,000 could actually
affect any change in where the money actually went, that it looked more like a security
than an actual general partnership" (R. 577 at 119). Taggert also testified that the
number of partners was important in looking a control because "if there are so many
partners that in effect you really don't have any control because the control is so diluted,
then it tends to indicate that it would be a security because you can't-you really cannot
effectuate control over you investment" (R. 577 at 122).
Taggert testified that he had not reviewed any of the partnership meetings where
individual votes were conducted on the affairs of the partnership nor was he aware of
how partnership meetings operated in this particular case (R. 577 at 128-29, 133).

B.

Testimony of Rodney Blackford
Rodney Blackford lives in Colorado and is a geophysical and geological

consultant (R. 578 at 55). Blackford is a co-defendant with Cherry (R. 578 at 55). Prior
to trial, Blackford pled guilty to multiple counts of securities fraud pursuant to a plea
agreement (R. 577 at 56).
Blackford was the sole owner of Blackford Energy Company until December 31,
1993, when Linda and Bill Cherry became 49 percent owners of the company (R. 578 at
59). Blackford's role in the 10-well Big Snowy Mountain partnership was to "find oil
and produce it" (R. 578 at 59). Cherry's responsibility in regards to the partnership was
6

"to raise funds to drill the wells'* (R. 578 at 61). Blackford testified that Cherry had a
company, Power Financial, that he used to raise capital; and that Power Financial,
pursuant to a written agreement between Blackford and Cherry, had the option to
approve or reject any drilling proposals submitted by Blackford (R. 578 at 62-63).
Approximately 700 people invested in the Big Snowy Mountain project through
seven investment partnerships-including Shareco, Petro Tech, Bastion Oil, Three Rivers
and Gem Tech; and approximately 3 million dollars was raised (R. 578 at 63-65). In
regards to exhibit 16, Blackford had input in regards to the geological information but
the rest of the information was generated by Cherry, Dick Hewitt and others (R. 578 at
67). In regards to exhibit 17, Blackford add a "a few things like [his] personal history"
(R. 578 at 68).
Blackford testified that finder's fees were used to market the Blackford/Big
Snowy partnership (R. 578 at 68-69). Blackford testified that at least two partnership
votes occurred—one in August of 1993 and one in 1994—the votes were organized by
Cherry and others (R. 578 at 71). Blackford indicated that he had no control over how
the Big Snowy venture was structured (R. 578 at 76). Blackford also testified that
neither Zenger nor Cherry had any more control than any other joint venturer (R. 578 at
125).
According to Blackford, five wells were drilled under the Big Snowy project and
possibly two were successful in finding oil but still did not make a profit (R. 578 at 7274).
Prior to October of 1993, Blackford Energy had drilled to wells and neither was
successful (R. 578 at 74). But Blackford had been involved in a number of wells and a
great many of them were successful (R. 578 at 80-81). In addition, another well was
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being drilled under the Big Snowy project which Blackford believes would have been
successful had the SEC not frozen all funds (R. 578 at 97).
Prior to the agreement between Cherry and Blackford, Cherry informed him of
prior problems with Texas, Montana and the SEC (R. 578 at 107). Blackford also met
with Cherry and Dick Hewitt, who told Blackford that while Cherry could not conduct
business in Texas or Montana he was very good at raising money and could see "no
problems" with Blackford doing business with Cherry (R. 578 at 107-08). Blackford
testified that he and the others relied on Hewitt and that it was Hewitt who had set up the
structure of the business venture (R. 578 at 110). Blackford dealt more with Linda
Cherry than Tom Cherry (R. 578 at 110).

C.

Testimony of Richard Hewitt
Richard Hewitt is a securities lawyer from Texas (R. 579 at 7). From 1964-1979

Hewitt worked with the SEC; and had been in private practice since 1981 (R. 579 at 7).
In 1991, Hewitt was hired by Cherry Energy in Texas (R. 579 at 12). The Texas
State Securities Board brought a cease and decist action against Cherry and Cherry
Energy (R. 579 at 12). Cherry and company consented to the action and agreed not to
violate the Texas Securities Act in the future (R. 579 at 12).
Prior to 1993, Hewitt advised Cherry of "both the federal and state registration
requirements for the offer and sale of securities" and "on other parts securities law" (R.
579 at 28). Hewitt also reviewed with him "the broker/dealer licensing provisions" for
individual sales agents (R. 579 at 28).
In 1993, Hewitt was contacted by Cherry about a new oil venture (R. 579 at 28).
Hewitt testified that he warned Cherry not to return to the oil business given his previous
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ventures but that if he did get back in that he should limit his activities to hiring and
training salesman and explaining the business to the salesmen (R. 579 at 30). Hewitt
informed Cherry that he should not sell be an officer or director, or handle money for the
company and that he should act only as a consultant (R. 579 at 30).
Hewitt then spoke with Blackford and explained to him that because of Cherry's
prior history, he would have to be "in charge of the company, would have to run the
company, the money would have to go to Colorado and not to Utah, and that he was
going to be actively in charge of the company, which we later formed known as
Blackford Energy" (R. 579 at 31).
Hewitt was retained to represent Blackford Energy (R. 579 at 8). Hewitt
"organized Blackford Energy" as a Colorado corporation and told Blackford to open up a
bank account in Denver (R. 579 at 32). At the request of Cherry or Linda Cherry, Hewitt
prepared a private placement memorandum in the summer of 1993 which is a "document
which would contain information that a prospective investor would want to receive in
order to make an informed investment decision" (R. 579 at 33). Although Blackford
Energy was claiming to be a joint venture and not a security, Hewitt testified that he "did
the private placement memorandum in the same format that [he] would if it were a
security" (R. 579 at 33). After initially dealing with Cherry, Hewitt dealt mostly with
Linda Cherry (R. 579 at 58). When Linda Cherry informed Hewitt of the second level
partnership, Hewitt testified that he informed her that he "thought that these were
securities" that probably would need to be registered (R. 579 at 59-60). Hewitt also
testified that he thought that they would need a general partnership agreement so he sent
them one without knowing the participants (R. 579 at 62-63).
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Hewitt also prepared the joint venture agreement between Big Snowy and its
partners (R. 579 at 36). Hewitt "envisioned" for Big Snowy Wtaa number of participants
each putting up $29,000 as they purchased an interest in the joint venture, and that that
would be the structure of the deal. I did not envision a second level of partnerships" (R.
579 at 39).
Hewitt testified that he was told of the existence of second level partnerships by
Linda Cherry (R. 579 at 39). Hewitt said that he "cautioned her against that type of
organization" because he felt that the creation of another level would make the unit size
too small and too speculative (R. 579 at 39). Hewitt testified that he is not familiar with
Petro Tech, Shareco, Gem Tech or Equity Partnership (R. 579 at 38). Hewitt testified
that he did not know that there were ultimately approximately 700 investors in Big
Snowy and that if he "ever heard that figure" it was only from the SEC after they
"stopped the sales" (R. 579 at 44). Hewitt testified that as the attorney for the company
he would have liked to have been informed about the number of investors "because if
you had 750 investors in two offerings, as a practical matter, unless they are all highly
sophisticated, accredited investors, you could not have a private placement, and you have
blown your exemption from registration" (R. 579 at 45).
'Hewitt testified that in his opinion Blackford Energy constituted a "security" (R.
579 at 41).
Hewitt prepared exhibit 16 but Cherry's disciplinary history was not included
because he understood that Cherry was only acting as a consultant and that the
management of Blackford Energy was limited to Blackford (R. 579 at 41-42).
Hewitt was originally charged as a co-defendant in this prosecution but the
charges were dismissed prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 579 at 10).
10

On rebuttal Hewitt testified he attempted to structure Blackford Energy as a
general partnership but that he treated it like a security (R. 583 at 81).
Hewitt also testified that his Blackford Energy files had been destroyed between
the time he was fired and before any indictment (R. 583 at 93).

D.

Testimony of Linda Cherry
Linda Cherry testified that Tom Cherry is her older brother (R. 581 at 5). Linda

first heard of Blackford from Cherry, who had learned of him from Rick Murray and
who had been called by Blackford (R. 581 at 7, 8). Linda learned from Cherry that he
had been in contact with Hewitt about another project and that Hewitt had told him
"about some new legislation" and that if he ever wanted to do another project "he could
do it as a non-security if he followed certain strict guidelines" (R. 581 at 8).
After numerous conversations between Cherry and Blackford, Linda and Cherry
drove to Denver to meet with Blackford (R. 581 at 8-9). Linda did some investigation of
Blackford and received positive responses as to his character and ability in the oil
business (R. 581 at 11). Cherry also asked Linda "to handle the legal and business end
of things" and she agreed (R. 581 at 14).
Linda spoke with Hewitt and, according to her notes, "He explained that there
was new legislation that had occurred in 1986 by Senator Lloyd Bentsen whereby it
restored the old Texas oil deal" and that if a project was structured "exactly right it would
be a non-security" (R. 581 at 17). Hewitt subsequently sent some court cases to Linda
(R. 581 at 17). Hewitt "said we must be a joint venture general partnership. He said
that anyone joining that is liable for more than their investment, whereas, in a limited
partnership you're only liable for what you put in" (R. 581 at 21). Linda testified that
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Hewitt also told her that "We must structure the program as working interest which is a
particular kind of oil and gas ownership where the person is involved they vote and pay
expenses and so on. He said, have a joint venture agreement where the operator can be
voted out and a new one voted in. He said joint venture partners must have access to the
well site, you know, for information to go out and so on. He said the partners must be
active in having a vote and voting to keep them very informed. He said the partners must
have the opportunity to examine the title information to make sure there were no
encumberances on the piece of land that they were proposing to drill on" (R. 581 at 2122). Hewitt also told Linda to have monthly partnership meetings and to do a newsletter
to keep the partners informed (R. 581 at 22-23). Hewitt also told Linda to give refunds if
requested by any partner (R. 581 at 23).
Linda testified that after the company was set up and after Blackford had drilled
the first well, a partner vote was taken on the completion aspects of the well and on the
second well (R. 581 at 28). Linda testified that she thought ballots were mailed to all
partners (R. 581 at 29-30).
Another vote was taken after the SEC acted as to whether the company should keep
drilling or offer a refund; and that the partners voted to keep drilling (R. 581 at 30).
Approximately 7 people asked for and received refunds (R. 581 at 30-31).
Hewitt informed Linda during one conversation that Blackford was to be the
managing general partner and that Cherry was to be a marketing consultant (R. 581 at
52). Hewitt also in another conversation reassured Linda that the venture was not a
security but a general partnership (R. 581 at 56).
When others wanted to invest Linda testified that she called Hewitt who indicated
to her that second level general partnerships could be established to facility these other
12

investors without affecting the non-security designation (R. 581 at 65-67). Hewitt
subsequently sent "general partnership papers for the little investors" (R. 581 at 68).
Linda also asked Hewitt if Cherry's past history needed to be in private placement
memorandum and that Hewitt indicated that it did not when Linda told him that Cherry
was a consultant and not and employee (R. 581 at 108). Linda testified that Hewitt then
removed the past history from the memorandum (R. 581 at 108). Linda testified that she
never received any indication from Hewitt that the Big Snowy venture needed to be
registered as a security (R. 581 at 123).
Linda testified that she related to Cherry the discussions she had with Hewitt (R.
581 at 143).
Linda testified that when individuals such as Zenger (and others including
salesmen and investors) would ask whether or not the partnership constituted a security,
that she would respond "We ha[ve] a securities attorney, Richard Hewitt, who [has]
worked for the SEC for 15 years, [is] well steeped in oil and gas and he [is] walking us
through this non-security and we [are] doing everything he [says] to do to qualify for
that" (R. 581 at 144-45).
Linda was charged as a co-defendant in this case and pled "no contest" to six
misdemeanors (R. 581 at 138-40).

E.

Testimony of Patricia Adams Leach
Patricia Leach testified that she is familiar with Blackford Energy Company

through her employment at Power Financial in 1993 (R. 579 at 87). Leach was hired by
Cherry (R. 579 at 88). Leach, as part of her employment, made telephone calls and set
up appointments for Cherry's salespeople from a prepared script (R. 579 at 88).
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Leach was also granted an investment in Blackford Energy as part of her
employment which eventually accumulated to a $2000 investment (R. 579 at 96-97).
Leach attended two partnership meetings where Cherry spoke (R. 579 at 99). Leach
received exhibit 17 but not exhibit 16 (R. 579 at 100). Leach from the materials she
received from Blackford Energy did not believe that she had any meaningful control of
operations (R. 579 at 106). Leach did, however, fill out the ballots that were sent to her
and returned them to the partnership (R. 579 at 108).

F.

Testimony of Darren Mangum
Darren Mangum testified that he worked with Cherry at Blackford Energy during

1993; and that Cherry is a friend of his father, David (R. 579 at 117), Mangum's official
title was "marketing coordinator" (R. 579 at 117). Between December of 1992 and April
of 1993, Mangum was involved with sales (R. 579 at 118). As part of his employment,
Mangum assisted in developing a marketing support manual to introduce selling agents
to the company policies and procedures as well as some form letters (R. 579 at 121).
Mangum testified that Cherry's official title was "Marketing Division Consultant" (R.
579 at 122).
Mangum was fired by Linda and Tom Cherry in December of 1993 (R. 579 at
119).

G.

Testimony of Steve Smith
Steve Smith was a salesman for Blackford Energy. He testified that Zenger's role

in the organization was sales manager (R. 582 at 36).
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H.

Testimony of Steven Anderson
Steven Anderson testified that he invested in Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 55).

Anderson testified that he believed the company to be a general partnership (R. 582 at
56). Anderson became a part-time sales agent for Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 57).
Anderson testified that he is familiar with Hewitt because "He was our legal counsel that
set up the general partnership entity and he was one we used most of the time" and who
set up whatever registering or licensing was required (R. 582 at 59). Anderson never
personally talked to Hewitt but was frequently in the room and listening by speaker
phone when Linda spoke with him (R. 582 at 59).
Anderson introduced Zenger to Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 61). After several
months, Zenger approached Anderson because he was concerned that the partnership
might constitute a security (R. 582 at 61-62). The two of them approached Linda Cherry
with their concerns and the three of them spoke with Hewitt by telephone (R. 582 at 62).
The conversation lasted 30-45 minutes (R. 582 at 63). Hewitt informed the group that
Blackford Energy was not a security and that it was a general partnership that did not
need to be licensed or registered provided the guidelines which had been previously
outlined were followed (R. 582 at 63-64). Hewitt also told the group not to worry (R.
582 at 64).
Anderson also testified that he had seen Hewitt's resume and knew he worked for
the Securities & Exchange Commission and that Hewitt had told them that "we do this
all the time in Texas. There are hundreds of companies that are set up this very way" (R.
582 at 64).
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Anderson also testified that he was privy to conversations with Hewitt about the
little, second-level partnerships (R. 582 at 71-72). Anderson testified that the smaller
second-level partnerships were Hewitt's idea and indicated that if these partnerships were
not set up then Blackford Energy "would be in jeopardy" of losing their non-security
status (R. 582 at 73, 115).
Anderson testified that he had a conversation with Linda Cherry after the SEC had
closed down Blackford Energy (R. 582 at 106). Anderson was worried about what was
taking place and Linda "related to me that she had been on the phone with Mr. Hewitt
that day and said we just have to work through it, it's not a securities and he would take
care of it and, you know, it would be okay" (R. 582 at 106).

I.

Barry Allensworth
Barry Allensworth said he did some private investigation of Blackford and

Blackford Energy prior to investing in the company. As part of his work he spoke with
Hewitt (R. 582 at 135). Allensworth asked Hewitt about the partnership and as a former
securities broker, Allensworth asked Hewitt about whether the partnership constituted a
security because he "didn't want to be involved" with an unregistered security (R. 582 at
135). Allensworth testified that Hewitt informed him that it was a non-security (R. 582
at 136, 148). Allensworth testified that he spoke with Hewitt again in 1994 when the
SEC was attempting to close down the company (R. 582 at 139). Again Hewitt told
Allensworth that it was not a security (R. 582 at 140).

J.

Testimony of Ron Zenger

16

Ron Zenger testified that after he became involved with Blackford Energy he had
conversation with his previous employer who told him that he had concerns that
Blackford Energy was a security and that Zenger could get in trouble for being
unlicensed (R. 583 at 10). Zenger drove down to Provo and met with Cherry and others
and Cherry indicated that their attorney had told them that it was not a security (R. 583 at
11). Zenger was still uncomfortable so they called Hewitt who informed him that "this is
absolutely not a securities" (R. 583 at 12). Zenger also asked Hewitt if he could get in
trouble and was told that he could only get in trouble if he lied or embezzled money (R.
583 at 12-13). Zenger testified that he only continued is involvement with Blackford
Energy because of Hewitt's representations (R. 583 at 13).
Zenger testified that he was present on several occasions when Linda Cherry
spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 15). Zenger believes that Hewitt was fully informed as to
the parameters and workings of the company (R. 583 at 16, 45). Zenger also testified
that it was Hewitt who suggested the creation of the smaller partnerships (R. 583 at 1718).
Zenger testified that he was hired and trained by Cherry and that it was Cherry
who had communications with Blackford (R. 583 at 49). Zenger testified that he did not
believe that Cherry communicated with Hewitt once the company got started and that it
was Linda who spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 60).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cherry asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that
he "willfully" offered or sold a security without a license and that reasonable minds
must have entertained reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Accordingly, Cherry asks that
17

this Court reverse his convictions for sale of an unregistered security and sale of a
security by an unlicensed agent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S
VERDICTS THAT CHERRY "WILLFULLY" OFFERED OR
SOLD A SECURITY
Cherry was convicted by the jury of one count of sale of an unregistered security
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§61-1-7,21 and one count of sales by an
unregistered securities agent in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-3(1).
Cherry's co-defendant, Ron Zenger, was acquitted of both charges. Cherry asserts that
the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he
"willfully" offered or sold a security; and that the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt" that Cherry committed these crimes. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah
1997). This issue requires that Cherry marshal the evidence "in a light most favorable
to the jury's verdict." State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 611 (Utah 1996). Cherry has
previously marshaled the evidence relevant to these charges in his statement of facts,
but also does so as necessary here.
A common element to both crimes for which Cherry was convicted was that he
"willfully" offered or sold a security. See Jury Instructions #27 and 29, copies of
which are included in the Addenda. Jury Instruction #40, a copy of which is included
in the Addenda, defines "willfully" as follows: "A defendant acts willfully if it was his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Cherry
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asserts that just as the jury found the evidence insufficient to convict Zenger of the
crimes of selling an unregistered security and selling a security without a license, the
evidence was also insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he committed these
crimes.
Cherry recognizes that the fact that Zenger was acquitted of these crimes does
not automatically render his conviction invaled. See Stewart, 729 P.2d at 611-12.
However, Cherry asserts that, unlike the facts in Stewart, there is no rational basis in
the evidence for the jury's acquittal of Zenger and their convictions of Cherry. In
Stewart, two co-defendants were convicted of second degree homicide while two codefendants were acquitted. 729 P.2d at 611. While all four defendants were identified
as aggressors in the attack, the evidence clearly established that the two defendants that
were convicted of the crime possessed the knives which inflicted the numerous wounds
which caused the death. 729 P.2d at 611-12. In this case, however, there is no
evidence in the record to establish that it was Cherry's conscious objective or desire to
sell a security nor was there evidence which established that his conduct was "willful"
while Zenger's conduct was not..
The jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of reasonable reliance on the
advice of legal counsel. "Under Utah law, reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel
is an affirmative defense when the issue whether particular conduct meets the elements
of a crime." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 159-60 (Utah 1991). The
jury was instructed that reliance on the advice of counsel is a factor to be considered in
determining the willfulness of each defendants' conduct. Jury Instruction #42. The
elements of this defense are as follows:
(a) that they fully disclosed all relevant facts to counsel; and
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(b) that they requested advice from counsel concerning the legality of a proposed
action; and
(c) that they received advice from counsel that the proposed action was legal; and
(d) that they relied, in good faith, on that advice; and
(e) the counsel which the defendants claim they relied upon must be independent
and unbiased.
Jury Instruction #41. Cherry asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient
to establish this affirmative defense; and that it was insufficient to establish that his
conduct was "willful" as was a required element of the two crimes of which he was
convicted.
The State's only witness that Cherry possibly acted "willfully" in selling a security and
that he did not rely on Hewitt's advice concerning whether the partnership did not constitute a
security is Hewitt himself. Hewitt was originally charged as a co-defendant in this prosecution
but the charges were dismissed prior to the preliminary hearing. (R. 579 at 10). Hewitt was
previously employed with the SEC from 1964-1979, a period of fifteen years, and had been in
private practice since (R. 579 at 7). Hewitt prepared the joint venture between Blackford
Energy/Big Snowy and its partners (R. 579 at 36). The documentation indicated that the
partnership did not constitute a security and was a general partnership.
Hewitt testified that he thought the second level partnership were securities that would
probably need to be registered (R. 579 at 59-60). Hewitt testified that he cautioned Linda Cherry
about the partnerships because they might become too small and too speculative (R. 579 at 39).
Hewitt further testified that he did not know that there were ulimately about 700 investors in Big
Snowy and that he would have liked to know that because that "could have blown your
exemption from registration" (R. 579 at 44, 45). Hewitt also testified that he thought Blackford
Energy constituted a security (R. 579 at 41).
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However, Hewitt's testimony is contradicted by every other significant witnesssome of whom had not been charged with criminal conduct and who had nothing to
hide nor gain from their testimony.

Linda Cherry, who helped handle the legal issues of Big Snowy, testified that she
worked with Hewitt to structure the partnership so that it would not be a security. (R. 581
at 8, 14). She testified that Hewitt told her '\ve must structure the program as working
interest" and if it was structured "exactly right it would be a non-security" (R. 581 at 21,
17). When others wanted to invest, Linda Cherry testified that she called Hewitt who
indicated to her that second level general partnerships could be established to facility
these other investors without affecting the non-security designation (R. 581 at 65-67).
Linda Cherry further testified that they were doing everything Hewitt was telling them to
do to qualify as a non-security (R. 581 at 144-45). Linda finally testified that she never
received any indication from Hewitt that the Big Snowy venture needed to be registered
as a security (R. 581 at 123).
Steven Anderson, who was an investor and part-time sales agent for Blackford
Energy (R. 582 at 56-57), testified that Hewitt was the "legal counsel that set up the
general partnership entity and he was the one we used most of the time" and that Hewitt
was the one that set up whatever registering or licensing was required (R. 582 at 59).
Anderson testified that he became concerned whether the partnership might constitute a
security, but then he was personally informed by Hewitt via telephone that Blackford
Energy was not a security and that it did not need to be licensed or registered (R. 582 at
63-64). Anderson also testified that he saw Hewitt's resume and knew that he had
worked for the SEC (R. 582 at 64). Anderson further testified that Hewitt told him,
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referring to the partnership, "we do this all the time in Texas. There are hundreds of
companies that are set up this very way" (R. 582 at 64). After Anderson found out that
the SEC had closed down Blackford Energy, he testified that Linda Cherry told him that
she had been on the phone with Hewitt and Hewitt said he would take care of it and that
it was not a securities (R. 582 at 106).
Barry Allensworth testified that, before he invested in the company, he asked
Hewitt whether the partnership constituted a security because he "didn't want to be
involved" with an unregistered security (R. 582 at 135). Allensworth testified that
Hewitt informed him that it was a non-security (R. 582 at 136, 148). After the SEC was
attempting to close down the company in 1994, Allensworth testified that Hewitt again
told him that it was non-security (R. 582 at 140).
Rodney Blackford was the sole owner of Blackford Energy until December 31,
1993 (R. 578 at 59). Blackford testified that he and the others relied on Hewitt and that
it was Hewitt who had set up the structure of the business venture (R. 578 at 110).
Ron Zenger testified that after he became involved with Blackford Energy he had
conversation with his previous employer who told him that he had concerns that
Blackford Energy was a security and that Zenger could get in trouble for being
unlicensed (R. 583 at 10). Zenger drove down to Provo and met with Cherry and others
and Cherry indicated that their attorney had told them that it was not a security (R. 583 at
11). Zenger was still uncomfortable so they called Hewitt who informed him that 'this is
absolutely not a securities" (R. 583 at 12). Zenger also asked Hewitt if he could get in
trouble and was told that he could only get in trouble if he lied or embezzled money (R.
583 at 12-13). Zenger testified that he only continued is involvement with Blackford
Energy because of Hewitt's representations (R. 583 at 13).
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Zenger testified that he was present on several occasions when Linda Cherry
spoke with Hewitt (R. 583 at 15). Zenger believes that Hewitt was fully informed as to
the parameters and workings of the company (R. 583 at 16, 45). Zenger also testified
that it was Hewitt who suggested the creation of the smaller partnerships (R. 583 at 1718).
Cherry asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish that
he, like Zenger, reasonably relied on the advice of counsel and that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdicts that he "willfully" offered or sold a security.
Accordingly, as the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Cherry committed
these crimes, Cherry requests that this Court reverse his convictions for sale of an
unregistered security, a third degree felony, and sale of a security by an unlicensed
agent, a third degree felony. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Cherry asks that this Court reverse his convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2002.

Margaret R/ Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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SECURITIES DIVISION - REAL ESTATE DIVISION
^ v e s t m e n t adviser — Unlawful acts.
^ i t is unlawful for any person wno receives any cons\aiflj from another person pnmarily for advising the other
0***1 to the value of securities or their purchase or sale,
* " ^ through the issuance of analyses or reports or otherf*) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
£ e other person;
ft>) engage in any act, practice, or course of business
-kich operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
£ e other person; or
(c) divide or otherwise split any consideration with any
,5011 not licensed under this chapter as an investment
^risor or investment adviser representative.
tm (a) Except as may be permitted by rule of the division,
* is unlawful for any investment adviser to enter into,
attend, or renew any investment advisory contract unless
H provides in writing that:
(i) the investment adviser shall not be compensated on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or
capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the
funds of the client;
(ii) no assignment of the contract may be made by
the investment adviser without the consent of the
other party to the contract; and
(iii) the investment adviser, if a partnership, shall
XitfOfr? X ^ tfO&fet p ^ T \ ^ \fc\5wfc ^&Tv\.TOKX.^Si^XP} &&Xk%^\R.

the membership of the partnership within a reasonable time after the change,
(b) Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(i) does not prohibit an investment advisory contract which provides for compensation based upon the total value of a fund averaged over a
definite period, or as of definite dates or taken as of a
definite date.
!c) "Assignment," as used in Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(ii),
[fedudes any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation
i f an investment advisory contract by the assignor or of a
^osotrolling block of the assignor's outstanding voting
Securities by a security holder of the assignor.
k£(d) If the investment adviser is a partnership, no asSpiment of an investment advisory contract is considered
1B result from the death or withdrawal of a minority of the
pembers of the investment adviser having only a minority interest in the business of the investment adviser, or
Tbm the admission to the investment adviser of one or
•ore members who, after admission, will be only a
•inority of the members and will have only a minority
interest in the business.
8 H t is unlawful for any investment adviser to take or have
* W y of any securities or funds of any client if:
(a) the division by rule prohibits custody; or
(b) in the absence of a rule, the investment adviser fails
^*WaX$ 'Chs a\v\s\on ftiat^ne^ias or may^have custody.
'JThe division may by rule adopt exemptions from Sub• w s 61-l-2(2)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) where such exemptions
5*nsistent with the public interest and within the pury * fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this
1993

Licensing of broker-dealers, a g e n t s , a n d i n v e s t UJ
ment a d v i s e r s .
"*J It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this
| * » a broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed
5 * this chapter
*a> It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to
?Ptoy or engage an agent unless the agent is licensed.
J * license of an agent is not effective during any period
?*•& he is not associated with a particular broker-dealer
^flsed under this chapter or a particular issuer.
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(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection
^ s ^ ^Sv$K«^)fe*&« SA Ssssfcast, \»\«giT& \>i \erm\nd\.e&
those activities which make him an agent, the agent as
well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify
the division.
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this
state as an investment adviser or as an investment adviser
representative unless:
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment
companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of
1940, other investment advisers, federal covered advisers,
broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and loan
associations, insurance companies, employee benefit
plans with assets of not less than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies or instrumentalities, whether acting for
themselves or as trustees with investment control, or
other institutional investors as are designated by rule or
order of the director; or
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and
during the preceding 12-month period has had not more
than five clients, other than those specified in Subsection
(3)(b), who are residents of this state.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any:
(i) person required to be licensed as an investment
adviser under this chapter to employ an investment
representative is licensed under this chapter, provided that the license of an investment adviser representative is not effective during any period when
the person is not employed by an investment adviser
licensed under this chapter; or
(ii) federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or
associate with an investment adviser representative
having a place of business located in this state, unless
such investment adviser representative is licensed
under this chapter or is exempt from licensing. - - .
(b) When an investment adviser representative re*
quired to be licensed under this chapter begins or termi*
nates employment with an investment adviser, the invest*
ment adviser shall promptly notify the division.
(5) Except with respect to investment advisers whose only
clients are those described under Subsections (3Xb) or (3Xc), it
is unlawful for any federal covered adviser to conduct advisory
business in this state unless such person complies with the
provisions of Section 61-1-4.
i99tf
61-1-4.

L i c e n s i n g a n d n o t i c e filing p r o c e d u r e [ E f f e c
t i v e until J u l y 1, 2002].
(1) (a) A broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or in'
vestment adviser representative must obtain an initial of
renewal license by filing with the division or its designee
process under Section 61-1-26.
(b) (i) The application shall contain the applicant's
social security number and whatever information the
division by rule requires concerning such matters a5(A) the applicant's form and place of organize*
tion; •(B) the applicant's proposed method of doing
^business;
(C) the qualifications and business history of
the applicant; in the case of a broker-dealer o*
investment adviser, the qualifications and bus**
ness history of any partner, officer, or director
any person occupying a similar status or per*
forming similar functions, or any person directly
or indirectly controlling the broker-dealer or In*
vestment adviser;

SECURITIES DfVISION - .
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iiii) additional information is requested by the
jivtsion regarding the withdrawal application.
kt !i) If a proceeding described in Subsection (5)(a) is
pending or instituted, the director shall designate by
order when and under what conditions the with(irawal becomes effective.
iii) If additional information is requested, withdrawal is effective 30 days after the additional information is filed,
(c) (i) If n o proceeding is pending or instituted, and
withdrawal automatically becomes effective, the director may initiate a revocation or suspension proceeding under Section 61-1-6 within one year after
withdrawal became effective.
(ii) The director shall enter any order under Subsection (l)(b) as of the last date on which the license
was effective.
1991
Court-ordered d i s c i p l i n e .
""<|it division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or
»the use of a license issued under this chapter if so
! bv a court.
1997
^ 4 - 7 . Registration before sale.
fr» unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in
& wCtce aaiess it is registered under this chapter, the
• M B T J or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14, or
JliiKurity is a federal covered security for which a notice
f k f has been made pursuant to the provisions of Section
R44&5.
1997
Registration b y notification.
tiB.The following securities may be registered by notificajp^vbether or not they are also eligible for registration by
•HtfeatioQ under Section 61-1-9:
M) any security whose issuer and any predecessors
pSre been in continuous operation for at least five years if
Ibtrc has been no default during the current fiscal year or
: vkhin the three preceding fiscal years in the payment of
interest, or dividends on any security of the
ar, or any predecessor, with a fixed maturity or a fixed
^ st or dividend provision, and the issuer and any
jpdecessors during the past three fiscal years have had
gfcrige net earnings, determined in accordance with
9*enlly accepted accounting principles:
(i) which are applicable to all securities without a
foed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provision outstanding at the date the registration statement is filed and equal to at least 5% of the amount of
such outstanding securities, as measured by the
niaxmium offering price or the market price on a day,
•elected by the registrant, within 30 dajys before the
date of filing the registration statement, whichever is
togher, or book value on a day, selected by the
registrant, within 90 days of the date of filing the
registration statement to the extent that there is
neither a readily determinable market price nor a
sash offering price; or
(u) which, if the issuer and any predecessors have
°fX> had any security of the type specified in Subsect*01* (lXa)(i) outstanding for three full fiscal years,
Jjual to at least 5% of the amount, as measured in
Subsection (l)(a)(i), of all securities which will be
°utstanding if all the securities being offered or
Proposed to be offered, whether or not they are
proposed to be registered or offered in this state, are
issuedflit

j ^ * any security, other than a certificate of interest or
g~"^Pation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in
^ ; V H , € n t s °ut of production under such a title or lease,
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registered for nonissuer distribution if any security of the
same class has ever been registered under this chapter or
a predecessor act, or the security being registered was
originally issued pursuant to an exemption under this
chapter or a predecessor act.
(2) A registration statement under this section shall contain the following information and be accompanied by the
following documents in addition to the information specified in
Subsection 61-1-11(3) and the consent to service of process
required by Section 61-1-26:
(a) a statement demonstrating eligibility for registration by notification;
(b) with respect to the issuer and any significant subsidiary:
(i) its name, address, and form of organization;
(ii) the state or foreign jurisdiction and the date of
its organization; and
(iii) the general character and location of its business;
(c) with respect to any person on whose behalf any part
of the offering is to be made in a nonissuer distribution:
(i) his name and address;
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer held by
him as of the date of the filing of the registration
statement; and
(iii) a statement of his reasons for making the
offering;
(d) a description of the security being registered;
(e) the information and documents specified in clauses
(h), (i), and (j) of Subsection 61-1-10(2); and
(f) in the case of any registration under Subsection
61-l-8(l)(b) which does not also satisfy the conditions of
Subsection 61-l-8(l)(a):
(i) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date within
four months prior to the filing of the registration
statement; and
(ii) a summary of earnings for each of the two fiscal
years preceding the date of the balance sheet and for
any period between the close of the last fiscal year
and the date of the balance sheet, or for the period of
the issuer's and any predecessor's existence if less
than two years.
(3) If no stop order is in effect and no proceeding is pending
under Section 61-1-12, a registration statement under this
section automatically becomes effective at 3 p.m. Mountain
Standard Time of the second full working day after the filing
of the registration statement or the last amendment, or at
such earlier time as the division determines.
1991

61-1-9. Registration by coordination.
(1) Any security for which a registration statement or a
notification under Regulation A or any successor to Regulation
A has been G)ed under the Securities Act of 1933 in connection
with the same offering may be registered by coordination.
(2) A registration statement under this section shall contain the following information and be accompanied by the
following documents in addition to the information specified in
Subsection 61-1-11(3) and the consent to service of process'
required by Section 61-1-26:
(a) one copy of the disclosure statement together with
all its amendments filed under the Securities Act oM933;
(b) if the division by rule or otherwise requires, a copy
of the articles of incorporation and bylaws or their substantial equivalents currently in effect, a copy of any
agreements with or among underwriters, a copy of any
indenture or other instrument governing the issuance of
the security to be registered and a specimen or copy of the
security;
(c) if the division requests, any other information, or
copies of any other documents, filed under the Securities
Act of 1933; and

SECURITIES DIVISION - REAL ESTATE DIVISION
^ cke director may issue an order directing the
oerson to appear before the division and show cause
?rhv an order should not be issued directing the
«erson to cease and desist from engaging in the act or
• actice, o r doing any act in furtherance of the
activity;

(D) the order to show cause shall state the reasons
for the order and the date of the hearing;
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the
order to show cause upon each person named in the
order;
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the order to
show cause no sooner than ten business days after
the order is issued;
(e) after a hearing, the director may issue an order
to cease and desist from engaging in any act or
practice constituting a violation of this chapter or any
rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be
accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law;
(f) the director may impose a fine; and
(g) the director may bar or suspend that person
from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or
investment adviser in this state.
(2) (a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate
court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices
sad \a «n.forc& cTOn^lv&i&ft m t k this &a$tax QT axvy
rule or order under this chapter;
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought
under this section, the court may:
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment;
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the
defendant or the defendant's assets;
(v) order disgorgement;
(vi) order rescission;
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for
each violation of the act; and
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers
just; and
(c) the court may not require the division to post a
bond in an action brought under this subsection.
1994

tt-1-21. Penalties for violations.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully
"Wates any provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1
J d 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under
«is chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing
«* statement made to be false or misleading in any material
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the
crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less
toan $10,000;
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to
be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; or
(ii) (A) at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or
sought to be obtained was worth less than
$10,000; and
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money representing:
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(I) equity in a person's home;
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code; or
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
three years or more than 15 years if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to
be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and
(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator
knowingly accepted any money representing:
(A) equity in a person's home;
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal Revenue
Code.
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any
frde or order if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule
0T order.
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation
of this chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any penalty
oT remedy provided for in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b).
2001
61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions.
(1) No indictment or information may be returned or civil
complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after
the alleged violation.
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of this
chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided in this section
supersedes the limitation of actions provided in Section 76-1302 and Title 78, Chapter 12, Articles 1 and 2.
1992
61-1-21.5. Legal counsel — Prosecutions.
(1) The attorney general shall advise and represent the
division and its staff in all civil matters, administrative or
judicial, requiring legal counsel or services in the exercise or
defense of the division's power or the performance of its duties.
(2) With the concurrence of the attorney general, the staff of
the division may represent the division in hearings conducted
during the course of adjudicative proceedings of the division.
(3) In the prosecution of ail criminal actions under this
chapter, the attorney general, county attorney, or district
attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction, shall provide all legal
services for the division and its staff. The division may refer
such evidence as is available concerning violations of this
chapter to the attorney general or the appropriate county
attorney or district attorney for criminal prosecution.
1993
61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies
— limitation of actions.
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-117(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which
requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before
it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-110(4) or 61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person
selling the security to or buying the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with interest
at 12% per year from, the date of payment, costs, and
reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income
received on the security, upon the tender of the security or
for damages if he no longer owns the security.
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender less the value of the security when the

INSTRUCTION NO

. Z7

In order for you to find the Defendant, THOMAS CHERRY,
guilty of the crime "OFFER OR SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES",
as alleged in Count Twelve of the Fourth Amended Criminal
Information, you must find from the evidence all of the following
elements of the crime:
1.

From November 1992 through on or about March 1994, in
the State of Utah, Cherry;

2.

Willfully;

3.

Offered or sold a security;

4.

To a Person;

5.

When the securities were not registered or exempt from
registration'with the Utah Division of Securities.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
i of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt/ it shall be
x duty to find the Defendant Cherry guilty as to Count Twelve
the Fourth Amended Criminal Information.

If you believe that

evidence has failed to establish one or more of the above
lents beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find
Defendant Cherry not guilty of the crime charged in Count
ve.

INSTRUCTION NO.

js]

In order for you to find the defendant, THOMAS CHERRY,
guilty Of the crime "SALES BY AN UNLICENSED BROKER-DEALER OR
AGENT", as alleged in Count Thirteen of the Fourth Amended
Criminal Information, you must find from the evidence all 'of the
following elements of the crime:
1.

From November 1992 through on or about March 1994,
Defendant Cherry;

2.

Willfully;

3.

Transacted business in the State of Utah as an agent
by;

4.

Offering or selling a security, directly or indirectly;

5. .. To a Person;
6.

When Cherry was not licensed as an agent with the Utah
Division of Securities.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the Defendant Cherry guilty as to Count
Thirteen

of the Fourth Amended Criminal Information.

If you

believe that the evidence has failed to establish one or more of
the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your
duty to find the Defendant Cherry not guilty of the crime charged
in Count Thirteen.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'^

The State of Utah must prove, that the defendants acted
willfully in committing the elements set forth in Instruction
Numbers /2- to 3 Q - A defendant acts willfully if it was his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result--not that it was the defendants' conscious desire or
object to violate the law, nor that the defendants knew that they
were committing fraud in the sale of the security.

INSTRUCTION NO

•JdL

The elements of the defense of reliance upon counsel are as
follows:
(a)

that they fully disclosed all relevant facts to

counsel; and
(b)

that they requested advice from counsel concerning the

legality of a proposed action; and
(c)

that they received advice from counsel that the

proposed action was legal; and
(d)

that they relied, in good faith, on that advice; and

(e)

the counsel which the defendant(s) claim they relied

upon must be independent and unbiased.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4Z

Whether or not each defendant relied on the advice of
counsel as defined in Instruction No. 4JL, is one factor among
others which you may consider in determining the willfulness of
each defendants' conduct.

It is a means of demonstrating good

faith and may be evidence as to whether each defendant acted
willfully.

